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THE NEW TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION LEGISLATION:
A COMPARISON WITH FLORIDA AND DELAWARE
by William P. Bivins, Jr.
A new set of statutes,* carefully tailored for the closely-held corporation,
has been enacted by the sixty-third session of the Texas Legislature.1 The
statutes are the work of the Committee on Revision of Corporation Law
of the State Bar of Texas and will offer welcome alternatives to the incor-
poration of a small business.! This Comment compares the new Texas articles
with Delaware and Florida legislation' relating to the close corporation, in
an attempt to relate similarities and differences, point out overall effective-
ness, and indicate areas for possible improvement. The Delaware statutes
were chosen for comparison because they are recognized to be the most com-
plete close corporation statutes yet enacted,4 while Florida statutes have been
chosen for comparison as less than successful examples of close corporation
legislation.'
The form in which close corporation legislation has been enacted varies
from state to state. In Florida, the close corporation statutes form a separate
part of the state corporation law and may be considered complete within
themselves.' In Delaware, the close corporation statutes form a separate sub-
chapter of the Delaware corporation law but are designed to operate together
with the general corporation law.7 The new Texas statutes do not form a
separate part or subchapter of the corporation law, but rather, are placed
within the existing body of Texas corporate law with the provision that,
*The proposals for amendments to the Texas Business Corporations Act creating a
close corporations law in Texas were contained in S.B. No. 202. The 63rd Legislature,
Regular Session, passed S.B. No. 202 and Governor Briscoe signed it into law on June 15,
1973, to become effective August 26, 1973. This Comment was set in print before session
law numbers became available. Therefore, all citations are to sections of the Texas Business
Corporation Act wherein the amendments should appear. The full text of the statute is
appended to this Comment.
'The proposed corporation legislation is the work of the Committee on Revision of
Corporation Law of the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the State
Bar of Texas. J. Leon Lebowitz, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, was
prominent in the writing and preparation of the statutes. His help in furnishing copies
of the proposed statutes for this Comment is gratefully acknowledged. The close corporation
provisions and other recently proposed corporation legislation are briefly discussed in Kerr,
Proposed Amendments to Corporation Laws, 35 TEx. B.J. 1133-34 (1972).
2The statutes, designated as Articles 2.30-1, "Management of Close Corporation,"
2.30-2, "Agreements Among Shareholders of Close Corporation," 2.30-3, "Proceedings To
Prevent Loss of Close Corporation Status or To Enforce Agreements Among Shareholders of
a Close Corporation," 2.30-4, "Appointment of a Provisional Director for a Close Corpora-
tion in Certain Cases," and 2.30-5, "Shareholders' Option To Dissolve Close Corporation"
will follow, in sequence, the present article 2.30 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.
3IFLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5§ 341-56
(Supp. 1968).
'F. Hodge O'Neal has noted that the Delaware statutes "contain innovative and for-
ward looking features which merit the consideration of future legislative draftsmen." 1 F.
ONEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.14b, at 69 (1971) (hereinafter
cited as O'NEAL].
5 See Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment that Failed, 21 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 842 (1967).
'The provisions of the Florida close corporation legislation are "permissive and not
mandatory." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70 (Supp. 1973). It is not clear whether parts of
the general corporation law are interchangeable with or applicable to the close corporation
provisions. See Comment, A Comparison of the Close Corporation Statutes of Delaware,
Florida, and New York, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 515, 519 (1969).7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341(b) (Supp. 1968).
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"[to the extent not inconsistent with [these articles,] . . .all other provisions
of the [Texas Business Corporation] Act shall apply to a close corporation
as defined herein."8 Where the close corporation statutes appear to be lacking
in specificity, they are evidently designed to be read together with other
applicable corporate statutes.
I. THE CLOSE CORPORATION DEFINED
A number of states have already passed close corporation statutes,9 and it is
likely that the trend will continue. In general, a number of characteristics of
the close corporation which distinguish it from the publicly held corporation
have been recognized and provided for by legislation in various states. Such
legislation makes special provision for the close corporation by defining the
close corporation, restricting the number of shareholders, prohibiting the
public offering of stock, and enforcing transfer restrictions on stock, with
statutory provision to formulate and terminate the close corporation. If the
shareholders later desire, the close corporation may assume the status of a
publicly held corporation. Or, the close corporation status may be enforced
if the corporation has violated the definitional requirements." Special privi-
leges are often provided to minority shareholders, including the right to dis-
solve the corporation in the event of irreconcilable shareholder conflict. If
necessary, a receiver may be appointed to avoid dissolution.1' A wide range
of shareholder control agreements are possible, so long as they are listed in
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws, including provisions to allow
the shareholders to act as directors of the corporation or to run the corpora-
tion as if it were a partnership."2 Voting agreements among shareholders are
also permissible, and such agreements may alter the usual requirement for
majority approval of matters voted upon."
The various close corporation statutes already enacted give recognition to
a relatively new concept in corporation law which has been defined in a
number of ways. 4 Unfortunately, it may be that the difficulty of finding a
ITEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1A (1973).
"Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee have adopted some form
of close corporation legislation, either as isolated statutes within existing corporation law,
or as complete subchapters or parts of the state corporation law.
'
0 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-
.77 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
620 (McKinney 1965); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to .30-5 (1973).
"E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355(a) (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.77
(Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, S 157.86 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,§ 109 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:12-7 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104
(McKinney 1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.14 (Supp. 1971); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.30-3B (1973).
"2DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350, 351, 354 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 5 104 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1965);
S.C. CODE ANN. S 12.16.22 (Supp. 1971); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A
(1973).
3E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 218(c) (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75(e)
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 104 (1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616,
709 (McKinney 1963); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A(3) (1973).
"The problems of defining the close corporation have been discussed in a number of
articles. For this reason, only a limited discussion of the definitional aspects of the close
corporation is here attempted. For detailed discussion of problems in defining the close cor-
1973)
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satisfactory definition for the close corporation has discouraged state legisla-
tion from attempting to formulate and adopt special close corporation pro-
visions.'5 Broadly, the close corporation has been defined as a "corporation
whose shares are not generally traded in the securities market,"' " and has
been said to have "an almost complete identity between management and
ownership."" A more inclusive definition attempts to emphasize the active,
day-to-day management of the business by its voting shareholders as a unique
characteristic of the close corporation. 8
Close corporation legislation basically attempts to provide flexibility in the
control and functioning of the corporation. Unnecessary corporate formali-
ties are eliminated; shareholders are given wide discretion in choice of
methods by which they control the corporation; and finally, shareholder con-
flict and deadlock situations are dealt with in an effort to avoid dissolution.
As a result of legislation, a number of states now permit operation of the
corporation without a board of directors, and encourage utilization of such
arrangements as stock transfer restrictions, greater-than-majority vote re-
quirements, and other shareholder agreements that would be prohibited in
the control and management of a publicly held corporation."
General definitions of the close corporation notwithstanding, each state
has selected certain definitional aspects for its close corporation legislation.
The variations in the definitional approach taken by each state are the first
bases of comparison. The new Texas legislation defines a close corporation
as one in which there are no more than fifteen shareholders, whose issued
shares shall be subject to one or more restrictions on transfer and whose
poration, see O'NEAL § 1.02. See also Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948). For a more detailed discussion of the development of close
corporation legislation, see Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation--The Need
for More and Improved Legislation, 34 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966); Folk, Corporation Statutes,
1959-66, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875; O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Cor-
poration, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 641 (1965); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Cor-
porations, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341 (1958). See also O'NEAL §§ 1.5, 54. A num-
ber of articles have dealt with close corporation legislation within the respective states. See
Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Sta-
tutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525; Dickson, supra note 5; Folk, The Model Act and The South
Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275 (1963); Hall, The New Maryland Close
Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REV. 341 (1967); Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956); Comment, Statutory
Recognition of the Close Corporation in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 569 (1964); Com-
ment, Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 230 (1968). See generally
Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Economic Validity, 14 How.
L.J. 241 n.2 (1968).
"5 See O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 CORNELL
L.Q. 641, 644 (1965).
'O'NEAL § 1.2.
'" Tennery, supra note 14, at 243. See also discussion, id. at 246-50.
8 A close corporation is one "in which the owners of all the voting securities are engaged
in the management of the corporation. (1) Voting securities do not include those securities
to which voting rights accrue only on the happening of a contingency. (2) Management
means (a) active participation, apart from the exercise of voting rights, in the formulation
of corporate policy or in the making of decisions which affect corporate policy or (b) day-
to-day duties involving supervision of corporate operations or personnel." Note, Definition
of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (1963).
19For a state-by-state breakdown of these and other features of the close corporation
statutes, see Comment, Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. L. REV. 231 nn.8-10
(1968). See also O'NEAL § 1.14; Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems and Needs
of the Close Corporation, 1969 ILL. L.F. 1, 5-11.
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shares have been issued without any public offering."0 Delaware permits thirty
shareholders, requires issued shares to be subject to one or more restrictions
on transfer, and prohibits a public offering of the shares.2 Florida does not
limit the number of shareholders, but utilizes a more generic definition: "a
close corporation means a corporation for profit whose shares of stock are
not generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or
brokers."2
The definitional approach of the three states should be judged in light of
the particular needs of the close corporation to determine how well the
statutes meet these needs. Generally, a close corporation suggests a small
organization in which the shareholders are acquainted with one another and
are active in the control and management of the business. ' Although re-
stricting the number of shareholders to thirty, or even fifteen, may be reason-
able,' such restrictions are probably unnecessary, since too many shareholders
may ultimately lead to violation of other definitional aspects of the close
corporation statutes, such as open trading of shares, thereby causing the
corporation to lose its close corporation status.2 Likewise, too many share-
holders may make shareholder control cumbersome and difficult. But limita-
tion upon the number of shareholders may, unfortunately, prevent a group
of individuals from utilizing close corporation statutes just because they
number more than fifteen, or thirty, as the case may be. Nevertheless, limiting
the stockholders to fifteen may be considered an integral part of the Texas
close corporation legislation, inasmuch as definite provision for the enforce-
ment of close corporation status is included among the proposed statutes."
Such provisions indicate the intent that a close corporation should be formed
as such and remain so in order to protect original shareholders who pur-
chased shares believing that they would be able to maintain control over the
company.
Transfer restrictions on stock, the second definitional aspect of close cor-
poration legislation, have long been recognized as an effective means of
keeping a close corporation "close."'  Such restrictions, which permit a veto
power over potential stockholders and help to preserve original capitaliza-
tion proportions, have been made an integral part of the Texas and Dela-
ware legislation. Although transfer restrictions are useful in controlling the
20 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1 (1973). Restrictions on transfer must be of
the type permitted by id. art. 2.22 (1972), which includes any reasonable transfer restric-
tion, such as restrictions defining pre-emptive rights, buy-sell agreements, and first refusal
options.
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342(a) (1)-(3) (Supp. 1968).
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70(2) (Supp. 1973).
2See O'NEAL 5 1.07, at 21.
24 One writer suggests statutory limitation of the number of shareholders to 10 in order
to permit the utilization of subchapter S provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Bradley,
Toward A More Perfect Close Corporation--The Need for More and Improved Legislation,
54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1189-90 (1966).
1 See Comment, A Comparison of the Close Corporation Statutes of Delaware, Florida
and New York, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 515, 518 (1969).
"E.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-3 (1973).
'7 See generally Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969
ILL. L.F. 139. A number of restrictions are possible: first refusal options, employment-
related restrictions, buy-sell agreements, consent restraint agreements, and others. Cf. TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22 (1972).
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
close corporation, it has been shown that statutory requirements of one trans-
fer restriction, for definitional purposes, will not necessarily insure the close-
ness of the close corporation. 8 Since, in Texas, any sort of transfer restriction
will qualify,"9 it is possible to draft a restriction which qualifies under the
proposed statutes, but does not effectively restrict sale of the close corporation
stock to all outsiders.
Public offering of close corporation stock, the last definitional aspect of
close corporation legislation, is prohibited by Texas, Florida, and Delaware.3
The possibility of using any but the private offering exemption of the Securi-
ties Act"' is, therefore, unnecessary. It has been suggested that the better ap-
proach would be to permit stock registration or an intrastate offering. 2 The
private offering exemption, however, should be entirely adequate for the
close corporation contemplated by the Texas statutes.' If shareholders are
limited to no more than fifteen, it is difficult to envision a situation where
utilization of the private offering exemption would not be the simplest and
best approach to the issue of stock.
II. FORMATION OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
Close corporation legislation should require that a business operating as a
close corporation be clearly identified as such for purposes of notice to credi-
tors, potential shareholders, or other interested parties.' Unfortunately, there
are no specific provisions among the new Texas statutes which provide for the
formation of a close corporation, as distinguished from a publicly held cor-
poration. Nor do the statutes provide for the election of an existing corpora-
"8 Comment, Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 230, 235, 243-45
(1968). The transfer restriction requirement could be met simply by adopting a restriction
prohibiting transfers to competitors, or any other such restriction. Since anyone not a com-
petitor could purchase the stock, the transfer restriction would have very little effect in dis-
qualifying potential purchasers.29 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22 (1972).
"A brief introduction to aspects of the non-public offering requirement, together with
relevant securities legislation, may be found in Comment, supra note 28, at 239. While a
non-public offering requirement may be viewed as unnecessarily restrictive, it has been shown
to be an integral part of close corporation legislation, especially where subchapter S cor-
porations are contemplated. See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
21 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1970).
"2 Comment, supra note 25, at 519. Stock registration, intrastate offerings, or other such
considerations are relevant to the Florida statutes because no limit is placed upon the number
of shareholders of the close corporation. In Texas and Delaware, where close corporation
stockholders are limited, the non-public offering requirement is not restricted to the extent
that it is in Florida.
"
3 See Texas Securities Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-51 (1964). For a de-
tailed discussion of the private placement exemption, see Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for
Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537 (1964). It should be borne in
mind that, even if the offering is exempt under the Texas Securities Act, there must also
be an exemption under federal securities law or it must be registered under § 5 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. 77(e) (1970).
"4 The identification should either be placed in the articles of incorporation, or in a
designation to follow the name of the close corporation. But what should be avoided is an
open-ended approach whereby simply meeting the definitional requirements qualifies a cor-
poration as a close corporation. Under this approach, certain acts of the corporation could
be void or voidable at a later time if the status of the corporation were uncertain. Any litiga-
tion would first have to establish the proper status of the corporation before proceeding
to determine the validity of the act in question. By contrast, where the articles specifically state
"close corporation," that status should be considered de jure whether or not a de facto close
corporation existed, in accordance with definitional requirements.
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tion to become a close corporation. There are, however, provisions which
ensure that the corporation must do more than simply meet the three defi-
nitional requirements in order to be established as a close corporation. One
such provision is the requirement that the articles of incorporation and each
stock certificate expressly state that the business and affairs of the corporation
will be managed by the shareholders.' Problems will arise, however, in the
situation where the close corporation shareholders elect to establish a board
of directors. Since in this case no notice is required to be stated in the charter
or stock certificate, it would not be clear whether the corporation were operat-
ing as a close or a publicly held corporation. The presence of certain share-
holder agreements in the charter and bylaws' would also give exidence that
the business was organized as a close corporation, but such evidence might
not be conclusive. A simple requirement that the election by the shareholders
to organize the business as a close corporation be recorded in the charter
would eliminate problems of corporate status which might later arise in a
judicial proceeding.
Delaware statutes avoid problems of corporate status by providing that the
certificate of incorporation shall state that the corporation in question is a
close corporation.' Delaware further provides for the election of an existing
corporation to become a close corporation by requiring the filing of an
amendment to the original certificate of incorporation, such amendment to
be approved by a two-thirds vote of holders of record of all outstanding
stock. 8 Such provisions are simple, but completely adequate, and eliminate
the possibility of questionable corporate status.
Florida makes no special provision for the formation of a close corpora-
tion, but provides for the election of an existing corporation to become a
close corporation by requiring written consent by the owners of a majority of
the voting stock. 9 The Florida legislation has been criticized for its lack of
specificity with respect to the formation of a new corporation under close
corporation statutes.4 In Florida the status of a corporation may remain in
doubt, since no provision is made for recording or filing notice of that status.
Any corporation meeting the definitional requirements may be considered
either a close or publicly held corporation.
III. TERMINATION OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION:
SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT PRIVILEGES
In general, a close corporation may be terminated through loss of close
corporation status, voluntary dissolution by shareholders, or involuntary dis-
solution resulting from shareholder deadlock and disagreement. Loss of close
corporation status can occur involuntarily, by operation of law when defi-
35TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1B (1973).
"i Such agreements are listed in id. art. 2.30-2A.
17DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 343 (Supp. 1972).38 Id. § 344.
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70(1) (Supp. 1973).
4 Dickson, supra note 5, at 844. "The result is that any old or new corporation may
claim acceptance of the 'benefits' of the (Florida Close Corporation) Act . . . without any
showing to the Secretary of State that its stock is not 'generally traded,' or . . . it may claim
rejection of the Act in the same way." Id. at 845.
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nitional requirements are no longer met, or voluntarily, by vote of stock-
holders who seek general or public corporation status. Loss of close corpora-
tion status does not mean that the business ceases to continue, as is the case
with dissolution. Rather, the former close corporation continues in business
as a publicly held corporation.
Loss of Close Corporation Status by Operation of Law. As enacted, a close
corporation in Texas may be involuntarily terminated by operation of law
when it ceases to meet the definitional requirements by having more than
fifteen shareholders.41 When this occurs, the president of the corporation is
required to call a meeting of shareholders to elect a board of directors. If the
meeting is not called by the president, any shareholder, whether or not en-
titled to vote, may call the meeting for the purpose of electing directors.
Absent provisions in the charter for the number of directors to be elected
upon termination of close corporation status, three directors will be elected
and close corporation status ceases."
Delaware provides for the loss of close corporation status by operation of
law' when any one of the three definitional requirements" are no longer met.
Florida statutes embody no special provision for dissolution by law when
definitional requirements cease to be met. Lack of such provisions may result
from the broad definition of the close corporation in Florida. Presumably,
termination of close corporation status could result only when shares are
openly traded.
Although close corporation status may cease upon failure to maintain defi-
nitional requirements, both Texas and Delaware have provisions which permit
shareholders, if they choose, to enforce the close corporation status.' Florida
statutes lack such provisions. In Texas, any stockholder may file a petition in
any court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the corporation from losing
its status as a close corporation by enjoining the performance of any act
which will cause loss of that status.' Likewise, the power of the court may
be invoked to prevent transfer of shares in violation of restrictions on transfer
or public offering or solicitation of shares.4' By means of these provisions, the
shareholders' investment is protected; what was initiated as a close corporation
remains a close corporation so long as shareholders choose to exercise the
privilege of seeking restraint of any act that would lead to a loss of close
corporation status.
The Delaware provisions for proceedings to prevent loss of close corpora-
tion status are similar to the proposed Texas statutes. The corporation, or
41 TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-1C (1973). Although there are three definitional
requirements, this article mentions only the first and second requirements (stockholders
limited to 15, holding shares in accordance with restrictions on transfer). This article would
probably apply to the violation of restrictions on public offering of shares.
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 345 (Supp. 1972).
"I.e., stockholders in excess of 30, transfer of stock in violation of restrictions, or a
public offering of stock, id. § 342.
4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 348 (Supp. 1968); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.30-3 (1973).
4TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-3A (1973).
" Id. art. 2.30-3C.
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any shareholder, may sue to prevent loss of status. " In addition, the Delaware
statutes require the corporation to notify the secretary of state within thirty
days upon the discovery of a breach of a qualifying condition." If necessary
steps are not taken to correct the situation, an automatic termination of close
corporation status results."
Loss of Close Corporation Status by Vote of Shareholders. Only Delaware
makes specific provision for voluntary termination of close corporation status. 1
If the shareholders decide to transform their close corporation into a publicly
held corporation, they may, with the approval of the holders of two-thirds of
the shares outstanding, amend the charter to obtain general corporation
status. If provided by the certificate of incorporation, more than a two-thirds
vote may be required, and any amendment to such a provision will require
the same vote as required to terminate the close corporation status. Such
requirements make it easier for the incorporators to protect the close corpora-
tion status if they have so provided in the articles of incorporation.
In Florida and Texas no specific provisions exist as to voluntary termination
of close corporation status. In Texas the problem is further complicated be-
cause, as already indicated," no provision is made for the formation of a
close corporation, causing requisites for termination to be equally unclear.
Since there are no specific provisions, other applicable statutes outside the
close corporation provisions, but within the Texas Business Corporation Act,
must be utilized. Presumably, only amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion, in accordance with general corporation statutes, would bring about the
change in status. Amendment of the articles would require approval of holders
of two-thirds of the stock outstanding." When there is no board of directors
in the close corporation to approve submission of the amendment to the
shareholders, as required, the shareholders themselves would be deemed to
be directors. 4 If, for any reason, the articles of incorporation could not be
amended to effect the transformation to a publicly held corporation, complete
dissolution would be the only remaining possibility to terminate close cor-
poration status.
Termination of Close Corporation Status by Involuntary Dissolution--Share-
holder Conflict Privileges. In addition to termination of close corporation
status by operation of law or by vote of shareholders, close corporation status
may be terminated by forced or involuntary dissolution when severe disagree-
ment and deadlock among shareholders preclude any reasonable possibility
of continuing the business. In such a situation, important shareholder conflict
48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 348(b) (Supp. 1968).49 Id. 5 3 4 8(a) (1).
" Id. 5 348(a) (1), (2).
51 Id. 5 346.
82 See notes 34-40 supra, and accompanying text.
53TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.02A(3) (1956).
54Id. art. 4.02A(1). This article requires the board of directors to approve any amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation. Since in the close corporation, a board of directors




privileges are involved: privileges which can be exercised in time of deadlock
or disagreement which help to protect individual shareholder interests. Such
privileges might include the right to compel dissolution of the corporation,
arbitration in time of deadlock, appointment of a receiver to liquidate the
corporation, or simply the right to demand repurchase of individual shares
by the corporation at a fair valuation. In the situation of disagreement or
deadlock, the protection of minority shareholders is particularly critical.
It has been suggested that a minority shareholder should be protected if
he wants to dispose of his interest, even if he has not bargained for the privi-
lege of withdrawing from the business." He should be able to liquidate his
investment on fair terms. Assuring the right of any shareholder to compel dis-
solution is another means to achieve minority protection, but only Florida
grants this right. Florida statutes give to the circuit court the power to dis-
solve close corporations involuntarily upon the petition of any shareholder
when the directors are deadlocked in management or the shareholders are
deadlocked in voting power and arbitration or other remedies have failed."
This is unquestionably the most liberal of the three states' provisions.
Although Texas permits any shareholder to petition the county court to
enforce, "by injunction, specific performance, or other such relief,"'" an agree-
ment among shareholders, and to order dissolution if the shareholder makes
a motion to have the corporation dissolved," such provision does not protect
the minority shareholder who has failed to make any protective agreement
which the court could enforce. Texas should simply provide, as does Florida,
that any shareholder may petition for dissolution.
Termination of Close Corporation Status by Voluntary Dissolution. Although
Florida makes no provision for voluntary dissolution of the corporation by
shareholder agreements, both the Texas statutes and Delaware statutes pro-
vide for the voluntary dissolution of a close corporation by the shareholders
when the articles of incorporation grant a certain percentage of shareholders
the option of having the corporation dissolved, at will or upon the occurrence
of any event or contingency. " Delaware statutes further provide that if the
articles of incorporation do not contain such dissolution provisions, the articles
may be amended by unanimous vote to include a provision for shareholders'
option to dissolve." A unanimous vote is required for amendment unless the
articles of incorporation specifically provide otherwise; but in no case may less
than a two-thirds vote of all shareholders be required." Both Texas and Dela-
ware statutes require that when a voluntary dissolution provision for a close
corporation has been approved, the existence of such a provision must be noted
on the face of each stock certificate of that corporation." It may be seen that in
' Hetherington, supra note 19, at 22.
5"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.77 (Supp. 1973).57 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-3A (1973).
" Id. art. 2.30-3B.
59DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (a) (Supp. 1968); TEx. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art.
2.30-5 (1973). The provisions in these two statutes are very similar.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355(b) (Supp. 1968).
61Id.
" Id. § 355(c); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-5 (1973). The provisions in
these two statutes are very similar.
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Delaware, Texas shareholders are unprotected when they cannot obtain the re-
quired percentage to block or to bring about the dissolution when the articles of
incorporation permit voluntary dissolution.
Under Texas close corporation statutes, when the articles of incorporation do
not mention shareholder options to dissolve the corporation, other provisions
within the Texas Business Corporation Act must be considered." In particular,
article 6.02 is applicable, providing that "a corporation may be voluntarily dis-
solved by the written consent of all its shareholders." 4 The corporation may
also be dissolved by a two-thirds vote of all shareholders, whether or not entitled
to vote, upon recommendation of the board of directors with notice to all share-
holders, such vote to be taken in a shareholder meeting." When there is no
board of directors to recommend the dissolution, the shareholders will be
deemed directors."
Alternatives to Dissolution: Breaking a Deadlock. Both Texas and Dela-
ware provide alternatives to dissolution. Texas statutes will permit the appoint-
ment of a receiver to rehabilitate the close corporation."7 The receiver may
order liquidation and involuntary dissolution only if grounds for such action
are met.6" In addition, the Texas statutes provide for the court appointment of
a provisional director when directors or shareholders are deadlocked to the
extent that the close corporation can "no longer be conducted to the advantage
of the shareholders generally."9 In contrast to the receiver, the provisional
director acts as a director of the corporation until it is able to function once
again without deadlock.
Delaware statutes likewise permit the appointment of a custodian or re-
ceiver for any corporation when the stockholders are deadlocked and the
business of the corporation is threatened with irreparable injury."0 Alterna-
tively, a provisional director may be appointed when the directors are dead-
locked."' He has the rights of a duly elected director, including the right to
vote, until such time as he is removed from directorship by the court. The
provisional director has no authority to take over and manage the corporation
in the way that a custodian or receiver would. The Texas and Delaware statutes
are, thus, very similar.
"3E.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 6.01-.07 (1956).64 Id. art. 6.02A.
MId. art. 6.03A (3).
"Id. art. 2.30-1B(1) (1973).
67 Id. art. 2.30-3B. The receiver is appointed in lieu of the court's granting injunctive
relief upon petition of a shareholder to prevent loss of close corporation status.
"Grounds for involuntary dissolution are listed in id. art. 7.01 (1971), and include
failure to comply with conditions precedent to incorporation, procuring articles of incor-
poration through fraud, transacting business beyond the scope of the corporate purpose, mis-
representation in reports and affidavits, failure to report or pay fees or taxes, and failure to
maintain a registered agent within the state. It is not clear from the wording of article
2.30-3B whether a receiver could be appointed only if loss of close corporation status
is an issue. The article should perhaps be expanded to cover any situation involving cor-
porate deadlock. The article might allow enforcement of such measures as arbitration, third-
party management, or forced buy-sell agreements before dissolution or rehabilitation could
be undertaken by a receiver.
"9Tn. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-4A (1973).70DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (Supp. 1968).
71 Id. S 353 (a).
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IV. AGREEMENTS AMONG SHAREHOLDERS OF A CLOSE CORPORATION:
CONTROL PRIVILEGES
One of the advantages of close corporation statutes is the possibility of
agreements between stockholders which would otherwise be held invalid in
a general corporation when the agreements have the effect of removing con-
trol from the directors and vesting it with the shareholders. According to the
new Texas legislation, shareholders may regulate basically any phase of busi-
ness by agreement to which all shareholders of the business have assented."
For example, shareholders may manage the corporation, they may place
restrictions on transfer of shares, they may operate the corporation as a
partnership, and may seek arbitration in time of deadlock." Such agreements
must either be written into the articles of incorporation directly or by refer-
ence, or be set forth in the bylaws, with the bylaws subject to examination
by any shareholder.74 When such agreements have not been incorporated into
the articles or the bylaws, the articles or bylaws may be amended by a
unanimous vote of all outstanding shares."' Finally, all stock certificates must
bear a full or summary statement of shareholder agreements, copies of which
will be furnished upon request. ' Otherwise, the agreements are not binding
upon transferees who obtained the shares without notice of the agreements.
The requirement that shareholder agreements be in writing, incorporated in
the charter or bylaws, has been criticized, since failure to record agreements
properly will render them unenforceable at a later date, frustrating the inten-
tions of the shareholders." For this reason, perhaps the new Texas statutes
should be reconsidered and such provisions eliminated. The requirement that
shareholder agreements be approved by unanimous vote, however, is far-
reaching, and ensures better protection of minority interests than is provided
in Delaware or Florida. '
Florida and Delaware have control provisions comparable to the new Texas
statutes. The applicable Florida statutes79 are similar to the new Texas statutes
with respect to the enumeration of phases of business which may be regulated
by shareholder agreement. In accord with the more liberal view, Florida does
not require that the agreements be incorporated into the charter or bylaws; but
contrary to Texas, which would require agreement among all shareholders,
Florida permits agreement among "all or less than all"" of the shareholders-
"TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A (1973).
" Id. arts. 2.30-2A(1)-(8). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75(1) (a)-(g) (Supp.
1973), with TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-2A(1)-(8) (1973).
74 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-21(1), (2) (1973).
7 Id. art. 2.30-2B.
7Id. art. 2.30-2C.
77"[Participants nevertheless often bargain among themselves for ... control arrange-
ments but fail to insure that they are implemented by appropriate charter provisions ....
[T~he result is that important contract rights cannot be enforced, the objectives of the
contracting parties are frustrated, and minority participants are deprived of protection for
which they bargained." O'NEAL § 1.14c, at 72.
78 For a discussion of the requirement of unanimity among shareholders in the manage-
ment or control of the close corporation, see Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Dela-
ware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 529-30. The consistent
requirement of unanimity is a special feature of the Maryland close corporation statutes.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75 (Supp. 1973).
80 d. § 608.75(3).
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an unfortunately vague approach. Minority interests consequently suffer. Dela-
ware also permits agreements among shareholders "restricting discretion of
directors."8 Shareholders making such agreements must hold a majority of the
outstanding stock entitled to vote." In addition, Delaware does not require the
agreements to be incorporated into the charter or bylaws.
Like Florida and Delaware law," in Texas, shareholder agreements may
be made with non-stockholders, but such agreements are binding only upon
parties to the agreements, thereby protecting the minority shareholders. 4
Texas does not specifically mention the possibility of agreements between
shareholders and third parties, nor are such agreements specifically prohibited.
The statute simply requires all of the shareholders to assent to the agreement.
Texas further provides that if agreements are made which act to relieve the
board of directors of certain duties, the shareholders will then be liable for
acts or omissions in the area of duty which they undertake to control."
Voting Agreements. Close corporation legislation also permits voting agree-
ments among shareholders. Voting agreements are effective in avoiding dead-
lock which can result when a unanimous vote would otherwise be required.
The Texas statutes permit such agreements, " but existing statutes restrict their
validity to ten years." Delaware" and Florida! have similar provisions for vot-
ing agreements, but Florida imposes no time limitation upon them while Dela-
ware does. ° A time limitation on voting agreements can be a significant dis-
advantage if it abridges the minority effectiveness of a voting agreement or
causes the agreement to lapse just when it is most needed." On the other hand,
a voting agreement not limited in duration might have the effect of locking
minority shareholders into a position that has proven unworkable or unfair.
Although no specific provisions exist for the enforcement of these shareholder
agreements in Delaware and Florida, Texas statutes carefully provide for the
enforcement of any restriction or any agreement "among any number of
[share] holders.'"
Shareholder Management of the Close Corporation. The new Texas statutes
provide for management of the close corporation by the shareholders rather
8 5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (Supp. 1968).
82 Id. S 350. Delaware does not enumerate areas for possible shareholder agreements as
do Florida and Texas. The effect is the same, however, as the Florida and Texas enumerations
are neither limiting nor restrictive (e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-2 (1973)).83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75(3) (Supp.
1973).
8TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-2A (1973).
85 Id. art. 2.30-2E.
" Id. art. 2.30-2A(3).
"
7 d. art. 2.30.
8 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (Supp. 1968).89FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75(3) (Supp. 1973).
90DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (Supp. 1972). Delaware statutes are uncertain as
to the distinction between a voting trust and a shareholder voting agreement with irrevocable
proxies. See Bradley, supra note 78, at 536.
81 See, e.g., ONEAL § 1.14 c. See also Bradley, supra note 24, at 1173.
9It has been observed that due to lack of such provisions, perhaps shareholder agree-
ments are often challenged as being invalid. See ONEAL § 5.09, at 35.83TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN. art. 2.30-3D (1973).
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than by a board of directors, if the articles of incorporation and each issued
and outstanding share expressly states that such arrangement is binding."
Otherwise, shareholders are deemed directors when the context requires," sub-
ject to liabilities for acts or omissions.' Action with respect to the regulation
of the business may be taken by the shareholders "in a manner permitted by
the [Texas Business Corporation] Act," with or without a meeting."7 Share-
holder regulation of business is controlled by article 9.10, which permits share-
holders to take action to regulate the business if consent in writing is signed
by all shareholders entitled to vote. Such consent has the effect of a unanimous
vote of shareholders.
Delaware statutes permit stockholder management of the close corporation
if this arrangement has been approved by a unanimous vote of holders of all
outstanding shares;" however, only a majority vote is required to delete the
provision for shareholder management from the articles of incorporation. Flori-
da permits shareholder management if provisions are made in the articles of
incorporation." With respect to the conduct of business without a meeting,
there are provisions similar to the Texas statute, permitting any action of the
stockholders to be taken without a meeting if consent in writing, signed by all
persons who would be entitled to vote, has been received.'
Partnership Control. Like Delaware and Florida, 0 ' Texas"' permits treatment
of the business and affairs of the close corporation as if a partnership,'" or the
arrangement of relations among the shareholders "in a manner that would be
appropriate only among partners."'" Control in a partnership manner is an
important aspect of close corporation legislation since it frees the associates
in a close corporation from the "obligation to map out their organization along
the lines associated with a widely held company."1" Control of the close cor-
poration may thus be arranged to suit the needs of the corporation and its
shareholders as those needs arise, just as in a partnership;' and the advantages
of limited liability and corporate taxation are not sacrificed. The position of
minority interests is protected by operating the business as a partnership, avoid-
ing many corporate "squeeze-out" techniques."'
Removal of Directors. The Texas statutes provide that the shareholders may
" Id. art. 2.30-1B.
"Id. art. 2.30-1B(1).
" Id. art. 2.30-1B(2).
"id. art. 2.30-1B(3).
9"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (Supp. 1968).
"9FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 608.72 (Supp. 1973).
'"Id. § 608.74.
101 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 354 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.75(2) (Supp.
1973).
'02TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A(8) (1973).
03 For an introductory discussion of the close corporation as a partnership, see Hornstein,
Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953).
'"1TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A(8) (1973).
'"Bradley, supra note 24, at 1148.
'" See, e.g., O'NEAL S 5.03a.
'Minority interests and protection are discussed in F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPUL-




make agreements to control the terms and conditions of employment of any
shareholder, director, or employee, "regardless of the length of time of such
employment."'' 1 Such agreements, so long as they were written into the charter
or bylaws, would permit complete shareholder control of the directors. Dela-
ware statutes refer to the possibility of removing a director,' while Florida
provides for the removal of a director with or without cause "by like action of
the stockholders as required for the election of such director," unless there is
a contrary shareholder agreement."'
V. THE NEW TEXAS LEGISLATION:
A BRIEF EVALUATION
From the foregoing comparisons, it may be seen that the new Texas close
corporation legislation is basically similar to that of Delaware. There are, how-
ever, certain favorable features of the Delaware and Florida statutes, absent
from the Texas legislation, which should be considered in appraising the Texas
statutes. There are also some features which are not included in any of the
three states' legislation which are of importance and ought to be part of the
close corporation provisions.
Formation Provisions. The Texas statutes lack specific provisions for the for-
mation of a close corporation or for the election of an existing corporation to
become a close corporation.11 This omission could be remedied by inserting a
simple provision, such as Delaware's,"' requiring the certificate of incorpora-
tion to state that the corporation in question is a close corporation.
Voluntary Termination Provisions. There are no provisions among the Texas
statutes which would permit voluntary termination of close corporation status
by the shareholders,"' unless so stated in the articles of incorporation. The
Delaware statutes,"'4 in providing voluntary termination requirements, avoid
calling into play other corporation provisions which would require the approval
of the board of directors before an amendment to the articles of incorporation
could be submitted to the shareholders. Such general corporation provisions are
applicable if there are no special close corporation provisions for voluntary
termination of close corporation status.
Minority Shareholders' Right To Compel Dissolution. The example that Florida
has set"5 by assuring the right of any shareholder to compel dissolution is an
example of minority shareholder protection which should be followed by Texas.
Additional protection would be provided by guaranteeing the right of an ag-
"
8STEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2A(4) (1973).
'0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 141(b) (Supp. 1972); see discussion in Comment, supra
note 25, at 527.
"
0 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.76 (Supp. 1973).
.. See notes 37-40 supra, and accompanying text.
"'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 343 (Supp. 1968); id. § 344 (Supp. 1972).
"'See notes 51-54 supra, and accompanying text.
1
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 346 (Supp. 1968).
"5FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 608.77 (Supp. 1973).
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grieved shareholder to compel the corporation to purchase his shares at a fair
valuation. But the Texas legislation has, at least, provided that a shareholder's
right to dissolve the corporation may be included in the articles of incorpora-
tion."' The only drawback to this provision is that it is of no value in time of
deadlock if such shareholder dissolution rights have not been included in the
articles of incorporation.
Requirement that Shareholder Agreements Be Incorporated into the Charter
or Bylaws. The requirement posed by the Texas legislation that all shareholder
agreements be incorporated into the charter or bylaws. 7 has already been shown
to be a requirement that will cause problems if the agreements have not been
properly recorded. For maximum flexibility, permitting unhindered control and
management of the corporation among the shareholders, the requirement to
incorporate all agreements into the articles of incorporation or the bylaws
should be reconsidered. In view of the situation where the corporation is run
as a partnership, neither Delaware nor Florida require incorporation of share-
holder agreement into the charter or bylaws; simply placing the agreements
in writing has been considered sufficient.
Time Limitation on Voting Agreements. Texas should remove the ten-year
limitation upon voting agreements among shareholders as it relates to the close
corporation,1 ' since such limitations can work against the minority shareholder.
Minority Shareholder Protection. Crucial in the formulation of any close cor-
poration legislation will be the provisions for the minority shareholder. The
concepts of majority rule cannot be applied to the minority shareholder who
may be financially unsophisticated and who, as is often the case in a small cor-
poration, may have invested a large portion of his financial resources into a
business with the expectation that he will have, and be able to maintain, suffi-
cient control over his investment. It has been pointed out that "no statute-
not even any one of the separate, integrated close corporation statutes-fur-
nishes adequate self-executing protection for minority shareholders who have
failed to bargain for special charter or bylaw provisions or for protective
clauses in shareholders' agreements.""' This is a significant indictment of close
corporation legislation in light of the special needs and characteristics of the
close corporation and the minority shareholder. If unsophisticated investors are
to be permitted the right to incorporate and run a business without a board of
directors, with only various mutual agreements to guide them, they should be
protected.
Providing for the right of any shareholder to compel dissolution of the cor-
poration is one minority shareholder protection which has not been incor-
porated into the Texas legislation. But the legislation does provide other sig-
nificant protection for minority shareholders by requiring a unanimous vote to
"
6 TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.30-5 (1973).
'I Id., art. 2.30-2B; see notes 75-77 supra, and accompanying text.
n TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30 (1973); see notes 86-92 supra, and accom-
panying text.
"9 ONEAL § 1.14c, at 74.
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approve all shareholder agreements, including amendments to the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws. The legislation also specifically provides for the
enforcement of shareholder agreements, transfer, and voting restrictions. In ad-
dition, any stockholder may petition for the enforcement of any agreement-
additional valuable protection for the minority shareholder.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new Texas close corporation statutes go far to achieve a successful series
of provisions for the closely-held corporation. No doubt, practical experience
with these statutes, as enacted into law by the sixty-third legislature, will sug-
gest further changes to be incorporated from time to time. Even as they now
stand, the statutes give evidence of careful consideration and thoughtful formu-
lation; they will provide a valuable new approach to incorporating for business.
APPENDIX
THE NEW TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION STATUTES
Article 2.30-1, Management of Close Corporation
A. A "close corporation" as used in this Article and in Articles 2.30-2 through
2.30-5 means a domestic corporation (1) which, at any given time, has no more
than 15 shareholders of record of all classes of shares, whether or not entitled to
vote; (2) whose issued shares of all classes shall be subject to one or more of the
restrictions on transfer permitted by Article 2.22 of this Act; and (3) whose shares
shall have been issued to its shareholders without any public offering, solicitation,
or advertisement. For purposes of determining the number of holders of record of
shares of stock in a close corporation as defined in this Article, shares which are
held (1) by husband and wife as (a) community property, (b) joint tenants
(with or without right of survivorship), or (c) tenants by the entirety, (2) by an
estate of a decedent or an incompetent, or (3) by an express trust, partnership, or
corporation created or organized and existing other than for the primary purpose
of holding shares in a close corporation, shall be treated as held by one person.
Nothing in this definition shall be deemed to affect the right of any corporation
which is not a close corporation as defined herein or its shareholders or directors
to provide for the management of its business and affairs by its shareholders, di-
rectors, or officers or to impose restrictions on the transfer of its shares or other
securities or to seek any remedy, or to exercise any other power or right, granted
or permitted by other provisions of this Act. To the extent not inconsistent with
this Article and Articles 2.30-2 and 2.30-3 of this Act, all other provisions of this
Act shall apply to a close corporation as defined herein.
B. If the articles of incorporation of a close corporation expressly so state and
if each certificate representing its issued and outstanding shares so conspicuously
(as defined in Article 2.19 of this Act) states, the business and affairs of such close
corporation shall be managed by the shareholders of the close corporation rather
than by a board of directors, and the following provisions shall apply:
(1) Whenever the context requires, the shareholders of such close corporation
shall be deemed directors of such corporation for purposes of applying any of the
provisions of this Act.
(2) The shareholders of such close corporation shall be subject to the liabilities
imposed by this Act or bylaw for any action taken or neglected to be taken by
directors of a corporation.
(3) Any action required or permitted by this Act to be taken by the board of
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directors of a corporation shall or may be taken by action of the shareholders of
such close corporation at a meeting of the shareholders or in the manner permitted
by this Act without a meeting. In addition, in the event of any action taken by the
shareholders, the consent of all the shareholders shall be binding upon the corpo-
ration. Such consent may be evidenced (i) by the full knowledge of such action
by all the shareholders and their failure to object thereto in a timely manner or
(ii) by a writing executed by or on behalf of all the shareholders or (iii) by any
other means reasonably evidencing such consent.
C. If a close corporation ceases to meet the definition of a close corporation as
set forth herein by reason of having more than fifteen (15) shareholders entitled
to hold shares in the corporation in accordance with any restriction on the transfer
of shares permitted by Article 2.22 of this Act or any provision of an agreement
among shareholders of a close corporation permitted by Article 2.30-2, whether or
not all such shareholders are entitled to vote, the president shall call a special
meeting of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon to elect a board of directors;
and if he fails to call such a special meeting within four (4) months from the date
when the corporation ceases to qualify as a "close corporation," any shareholder,
whether or not entitled to vote, may call such special meeting, with the same rights
and powers as are provided in this Act for the call of a substitute annual meeting
by a shareholder. At such special meeting, there shall be elected such number of
directors as have been specified in the articles or the bylaws, if the articles or by-
laws provided for the possibility of the corporation ceasing to qualify as a close
corporation; and if no such number is specified, three (3) directors shall be elected.
Article 2.30-2, Agreement Among Shareholders of a Close Corporation
A. The shareholders of a close corporation may, by an agreement to which all
the shareholders of the corporation, whether or not entitled to vote, have actually
assented, regulate any phase of the business and affairs of the corporation or the
relations of the shareholders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Management of the business and affairs of the corporation whether by a
board of directors or one or more of the shareholders or one or more other parties
to be selected by the shareholders;
(2) Restriction on the transfer of shares or other securities;
(3) Exercise or division of voting requirements or power;
(4) Terms and conditions of employment of any shareholder, director, officer,
or employee regardless of the length of time of such employment;
(5) Persons who shall be directors and officers of the corporation;
(6) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of profits;
(7) Arbitration of issues as to which the shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power or as to which the directors or other parties managing the corpora-
tion are deadlocked in the event the shareholders are unable to break the dead-
lock; or
(8) Treatment of the business and affairs of the corporation as if it were a
partnership or arrangement of the relations among the shareholders or between the
shareholders and the corporation in a manner that would otherwise be appropriate
only among partners.
B. To be valid, such shareholders' agreement either (1) shall be set forth in
full in the articles of incorporation of the close corporation or incorporated by
references therein by following the procedure prescribed in Section F, Article 2.19
of this Act, for incorporation by reference of restrictions on the transferability of
shares; or (2) shall be set forth in the bylaws of the corporation or incorporated
by reference therein, provided such bylaws and a counterpart of the agreement be
placed on file by the corporation at its principal place of business and its registered
office and shall be subject to the same right of examination by a shareholder of the
corporation, in person, or by agent, attorney, or accountant, as are the books and
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records of the corporation. If the agreement is set forth or referred to in the
original articles of incorporation, all the parties to the agreement shall serve as
incorporators of the close corporation. If set forth or referred to in an amendment
to the articles of incorporation, such amendment shall have been adopted by a vote
of the holders of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote by the
articles of incorporation. If set forth or referred to in the bylaws of the corporation
either when originally adopted or later amended, such provisions of the bylaws
shall have been adopted, amended, or ratified by a unanimous vote of the holders
of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote by the articles of incor-
poration.
C. Each certificate representing shares of stock issued by a close corporation
whose shareholders have entered into an agreement permitted by this Article shall
(1) set forth conspicuously a full or summary statement of such agreement on the
face of the certificate; or (2) set forth such statement on the back of the certificate
and conspicuously refer to the same on the face of the certificate; or (3) if the
agreement has been set forth in full in the articles of incorporation or incorporated
by reference therein, conspicuously state on the face or back of the stock certificate
that such shares are subject to an agreement among all the shareholders of the
close corporation and that the corporation will furnish to the holder of the certifi-
cate without charge upon written request to the corporation at its principal place
of business or registered office a copy of such agreement and that the provisions
of such agreement are on file in the office of the Secretary of State; or (4) if the
agreement has been set forth in full or incorporated by reference in the bylaws and
a counterpart of the agreement placed on file by the corporation at its principal
place of business and its registered office, conspicuously state on the face or back
of the certificate that such shares are subject to an agreement among all the share-
holders of the close corporation and that the corporation will furnish to the holder
of a certificate without charge upon written request to the corporation at its prin-
cipal place of business or registered office a copy of such bylaw or agreement.
Unless noted conspicuously on the stock certificates in the manner prescribed above,
such agreements even though otherwise enforceable among the parties thereto shall
not be binding upon a transferee of such shares unless such transferee is a person
with actual knowledge of the agreement, or such transferee acquired his shares by
gift or bequest from a person who was a party to such agreement in which case
such transferee shall be deemed to have actual notice thereof.
D. To the extent that it contains any provisions which would not be valid but
for Section A of this Article, an agreement authorized by this Article shall be valid
only so long as (1) no shares of the corporation shall have been issued by the
corporation through any public offering, solicitation or advertisement; and (2) the
corporation maintains its status as a close corporation as defined in Article 2.30-1
of this Act.
E. In the event a close corporation shall have a board of directors, the effect of
an agreement authorized by this Article shall be to relieve the director or directors
of, and to impose upon the shareholders who are parties to or are bound by the
agreement and who voted for or assented to the transaction in question, the liabili-
ties imposed by this Act or by law for action taken or neglected to be taken by
directors to the extent that and so long as the discretion or powers of the directors
in their management of corporate affairs is controlled by any such provision.
Article 2.30-3, Proceedings To Prevent Loss of Close Corporation Status or To
Enforce Agreements Among Shareholders of a Close Corporation
A. Any close corporation as defined in this Act, a shareholder of such corpora-
tion, or a person who is party to or is bound by an agreement among shareholders
of a close corporation, may file a petition in any court of competent jurisdiction in
the county in which the close corporation has its principal place of business, to
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have the court, if it shall deem the same equitable, issue all orders necessary to
prevent the corporation from losing its status as a close corporation; or to restore
its status as a close corporation by enjoining or setting aside any act or threatened
act on the part of the corporation or a shareholder or any other person which
would be inconsistent with its status as a close corporation; or to enforce by in-
junction, specific performance, or such other relief as the court may determine to
be fair and appropriate in such circumstances, an agreement among shareholders
of a close corporation permitted by Article 2.30-2 of this Act.
B. As an alternative to the granting of an injunction, specific performance or
other equitable or legal relief in any proceeding brought under Section A of this
Article, the court may, upon the motion of a party to the proceeding, order the
appointment of a receiver for specific assets of the close corporation or to rehabili-
tate the close corporation, or order the liquidation of the assets and business of
the close corporation, and decree its involuntary dissolution, as permitted by this
Act, but only if the court shall find that the grounds for such receivership or
liquidation and involuntary dissolution provided for in this Act exist.
C. Any court of competent jurisdiction in which a proceeding provided for in
Section A may be brought may enjoin or set aside any transfer or threatened
transfer of shares of stock of a close corporation which will adversely affect its
status as a close corporation, or which is contrary to restrictions on the transfer of
shares of such stock permitted by Article 2.22 of this Act, and may enjoin any
public offering, public solicitation, or advertisement of shares of stock of the close
corporation.
D. Nothing contained in this Article shall impair the power of any court of
competent jurisdiction in any proceeding properly brought before it to enforce any
restriction on the transfer of shares or other securities permitted by Article 2.22
of this Act or any agreement among any number of holders of the securities of a
corporation or any number of the holders of such securities and the corporation
not provided for in Article 2.30-2 of this Act and to grant whatever remedies may
be properly available in such proceedings.
Article 2.30-4, Appointment of a Provisional Director for a Close Corporation in
Certain Cases
A. Notwithstanding any contrary provision in the articles of incorporation, or
bylaws, or agreement among shareholders of a close corporation, any close corpora-
tion as defined in this Act, a shareholder of such corporation, or a person who is
a party to or who is bound by an agreement among shareholders of a close cor-
poration, may file a petition in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county
in which the corporation has its principal place of business to have the court
appoint a provisional director for the close corporation when it is established that
the directors, or the shareholders if they have been empowered to manage the
business and affairs of the close corporation as permitted by this Act are so divided
respecting the management of the corporation's business and affairs that the votes
required for action by the board of directors, or the shareholders, as the case may
be, cannot be obtained with the consequence that the business and affairs of the
close corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders
generally.
B. A provisional director shall be an impartial person who is neither a share-
holder nor a creditor of the corporation or of any subsidiary or affiliate of the
corporation, and whose further qualifications, if any, may be determined by the
court. A provisional director is not a receiver of the close corporation and does not
have the powers and duties of receivers appointed under Articles 7.04-7.07 of this
Act. A provisional director shall have all the rights and powers of a duly elected
director of the close corporation, or the rights and powers of vote of a shareholder
if management of the business and affairs of the close corporation has been vested
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in its shareholders as permitted by this Act, including the right to notice of and
to vote at meetings of directors or shareholders, as the case may be. A provisional
director shall serve until removed by order of the court or by a vote of a majority
of the directors, or the shareholders, as the case may be, or if the articles of incor-
poration require the concurrence of a greater majority for action by the directors,
or the shareholders, as the case may be, then by that majority. The compensation
of a provisional director shall be determined by an agreement between him and
the close corporation subject to the approval of the court, which may fix his com-
pensation in the absence of agreement or in the event of disagreement between the
provisional director and the close corporation.
Article 2.30-5, Shareholders' Option To Dissolve Close Corporation
A. The articles of incorporation of any close corporation as defined in this Act
may include a provision granting to any shareholder, or to the holders of any
specified number or percentage of shares of any class of stock, an option to have
the close corporation dissolved at will or upon the occurrence of any specified
event or contingency. Whenever any such option to dissolve is exercised, the share-
holders exercising such option shall give written notice thereof to all other share-
holders. After the expiration of thirty (30) days following the sending of such
notice, the dissolution of the close corporation shall proceed as if all its share-
holders had consented in writing to dissolution of the corporation as provided in
Article 6.02 of this Act.
B. Each certificate of shares of a close corporation whose articles of incorpora-
tion authorize dissolution as permitted by this article shall (1) set forth con-
spicuously a full or summary statement of such provision on the face of the cer-
tificate; or (2) set forth such statement on the back of the certificate and con-
spicuously refer to the same on the face of the certificate; or (3) shall conspicu-
ously state on the face or back of the certificate that the corporation will furnish
to any shareholder without charge upon written request to the corporation at its
principal place of business or registered office and that there is on file in the office
of the Secretary of State a full statement of the provision giving shareholders the
option to dissolve the close corporation.
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